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LIABILITY FOR LEGAL EXPENSES CAUSED BY TAX
CLAIMS INCONSISTENT WITH THE CONTRACT
IN THE SALE OF A BUSINESS
In the sale of a business, the seller wants to receive capital gains
treatment under federal income tax law, while the buyer wants to allocate
as much of the purchase price as possible to deductible items. One item
of negotiation is the covenant not to compete, since any money paid for
it is taxable as ordinary income to the seller 1 and can be amortized by the
buyer.2 The seller's complaint in Stern & Co. v. State Loan & Fin. Corp.3
was based on the buyer's claim of a deduction for a covenant not to compete
when no part of the purchase price was allocated to the covenant in the
contract. The Stern court held the buyer liable for legal expenses and fees
that the seller incurred defending its claim to capital gains treatment against
a resulting Internal Revenue deficiency assessment.
Plaintiff Stern sold the capital stock of its wholly owned loan com-
panies and agreed not to compete in the small loan business for five years.
The contract provided that the buyer, State Loan, was to pay 2,500,000
dollars for the capital stock and assume the liabilities of the acquired loan
companies. No part of the purchase price was specifically allocated to the
covenant not to compete. Stern reported the profits from the transaction
as capital gains from the sale of stock. The return was audited by the
Internal Revenue Service in 1958 and accepted without question. On its
return, defendant State Loan claimed that the difference between the book
value of the stock and the total purchase price was payment for the covenant
not to compete.
In 1959 the IRS disallowed State Loan's deduction and assessed a
deficiency, claiming that the buyer had purchased nondeductible good will.5
Two years later, while State Loan's case was still pending, the IRS re-
1E.g., tHamlin's Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761, 765 (10th Cir. 1954);
Beal's Estate v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 1936).
2 E.g., Gazette Tel. Co., 19 T.C. 692 (1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954) ;
see cases collected in 4 MERTE.NS, FERAL.. INCOME TAXATION § 23.68, at 154 n.31
(rev. ed. 1960).
3 238 F. Supp. 901 (D. Del. 1965).
4 State Loan had an alternative theory to justify the deduction which was con-
sistent with Stern's claim to capital gains treatment for all of its profits. See notes
41-42 infra and accompanying text.
5 Goodwill is an intangible asset which represents the ability of a business to
earn more than the normal rate of return on its investment EASTON & NEWTON,
ACCOUNTING AND THE ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL DATA 318 (1958). The acquisition
of goodwill in the purchase of a business is not deductible. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3
(1956), as amended, T.D. 6452, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 127. However, goodwill is a
capital asset and when sold gives rise to capital gains treatment. Rodney B. Horten,
13 T.C. 143, 149 (1949). A covenant not to compete is often necessary to protect




opened Stern's tax return and assessed a deficiency, contending that the
seller had received money for the covenant not to compete. Stern then
sued State Loan, seeking a declaratory judgment that the buyer had
breached the contract by claiming the deduction and an injunction to
prevent State Loan from contending in the Tax Court that it had paid
for the covenant not to compete. The court denied summary judgment
and stayed further action until the IRS proceedings involving the parties
ended.6 Those proceedings were terminated before trial: the seller retained
all of its capital gains treatment and the buyer was allowed to amortize,
for the tax year in question, one-fourth of the amount that it had originally
claimed as a deduction. Stern then sued to recover from State Loan the
expenses and attorney's fees incurred in its litigation with the IRS. The
federal district court held that the buyer's action in claiming the deduction
was a breach of contract which entitled the seller to compensation for the
expenses that it had incurred. The court reasoned that the contract's
reference to the purchase price as the price of the stock and the absence of
a specific allocation 7 to the covenant indicated that all of the money was
paid for the stock. On the theory of an implied promise that neither party
will do anything to deprive the other of the benefit of a contract,8 the court
held that the buyer had implicitly agreed not to jeopardize the seller's right
to treat all of the purchase price as the price of the stock; 9 the buyer's
6 Stern & Co. v. State Loan & Fin. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 702 (D. Del. 1962). The
court also denied defendant's motion for dismissal. Summary judgment was denied
on the ground that factual issues regarding the terms of the contract could not be
decided solely on the evidence presented in the briefs and affidavits. Id. at 708-09.
7 The inclusion or exclusion of a specific money allocation to the covenant not
to compete seems to be a dominant factor in the IRS's and the Tax Court's determina-
tion of the tax treatment of covenants not to compete. See note 14 infra. This reli-
ance may be misplaced in light of the likelihood that the parties may purposely leave
a contract vague as to the points on which they cannot agree. Each party might
reason that, in the covenant situation, the absence of an allocation leaves each party
free to claim the tax treatment most favorable to itself.
8 Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317, 326-27 (1920) (author of play denied right
to sell motion picture rights which would injure owner of the stage rights) ; Olsen
v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 212 F. Supp. 332 (D. Wyo. 1963) (implied promise not
to destroy value of property by draining oil through well on adjoining land) ; Coast
Cities Coaches, Inc. v. Whyte, 130 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961) (purchaser of bus
company not permitted to resell it to county where original owner could not be paid
from revenues as provided in the first contract); Elliot v. Pure Oil Co., 10 Ill. 2d
146, 139 N.E.2d 295 (1956) ; Willingham v. Bryson, 294 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Ct App.
1956) (lessees had obligation to develop oil lease so that lessor could get benefit
from the lease). See generally 5 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS § 670 (3d ed. 1961).
9 It is interesting to note that the court held that State Loan's breach was of an
agreement not to jeopardize Stern's right to treat the purchase price as the price
of the stock. This right is important only for tax purposes. But it appears that the
court was trying to avoid an explicit statement that the parties had bargained for
particular tax consequences. See the court's treatment of State Loan's letter of
August 30 to Stern, notes 30-32 infra and accompanying text, in which State Loan
indicated that Stern's profits would be capital gains. 238 F. Supp. at 904. The
court held that this letter was part of the contract, id. at 912, but said that Stern's
rights did not depend upon this representation of the tax consequences since Stern
relied on its own lawyer's advice. Id. at 914. Instead the court construed the letter
as an indication that the parties agreed that the purchase price was the price of the
stock. Id. at 913. The court may have chosen this approach to avoid a holding
that tax benefits can be bargained for, and such agreements are enforceable. While
the language of the opinion avoids such a conclusion, it is inherent in the holding.
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contention that it was entitled to the deduction breached the contract be-
cause it meant that the buyer was claiming that part of the money had
been paid for the covenant.10
Unfortunately, the court in reaching its decision did not face an issue
crucial to the case: whether expected tax benefits resulting from the in-
clusion or exclusion of a covenant not to compete should be an enforceable
part of a contract.
Congress has deliberately made the tax consequences of some trans-
actions-for example, the payment and receipt of alimony under sections
171 and 215 of the Internal Revenue Code-dependent upon the form of the
transaction."- By so acting, Congress apparently recognized that the choice
between alternative methods of setting up the transaction would be based
on tax considerations and implicitly sanctioned the effect this choice might
have on tax revenue.' 2 In the absence of a congressional determination
that taxpayers may minimize their tax burdens by changing the form of
the transaction to include a covenant not to compete, the substance of the
transaction should be the dominant factor in determining its tax conse-
quences. In fact, the special tax treatment given covenants not to compete
is the result of a judicial recognition of the particular characteristics of the
covenant transaction; 13 the tax consequences of the transaction are viewed
as flowing from its economic nature. The Tax Court recognizes this when
it assesses the validity of claims for tax benefits in transactions involving
covenants not to compete. Ordinarily the Tax Court will determine the
tax liabilities of the parties on the basis of the treatment given the covenant
in the contract. 14 However, if it is proven that the seller is incapable of
10 The damages incurred by the seller were caused by the buyer's claiming tax
treatment inconsistent with the seller's claim. See 238 F. Supp. at 914-15. The
court stated that these damages were foreseeable. Id. at 915. An examination of
the cases dealing with the inconsistent tax treatment of covenants not to compete
indicates that both parties are often involved in litigation with the IRS over the proper
tax treatment to be given the transaction. See note 26 infra.
11 Ordinarily, alimony payments are included in the wife's gross income, INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a), and deductible by the husband, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 215. However, if the parties agree to a lump sum settlement, that amount is not
considered taxable income to the wife, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(c) (1), and is
not deductible by the husband, INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 215. See BrrrYER, FEmERAL.
INcOME ESTATE AND GIFr TAxATION 182-83 (3d ed. 1964).
12 Obviously, a husband in a high tax bracket would prefer to have a deduction
for his alimony payments. If his exwife is in a lower tax bracket, the total amount
paid in taxes would be less than if he had paid the tax.
13 The rationale for treating payments received for a covenant not to compete
as ordinary income is that if money received for work performed is ordinary income,
so is money received for not working. Salvage v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 112, 113-14
(2d Cir. 1935), aff'd, 297 U.S. 106 (1936). The rationale for permitting the amorti-
zation of payments made for covenants is that the buyer has purchased a valuable
asset-the freedom from certain types of competition. See Farmers Feed Co., 17
B.T.A. 507, 551-54 (1917). The extent to which intangible business assets may be
depreciated is treated in Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956), as amended, T.D. 6452,
1960-1 Cum. BULL. 127.
14 See Barran v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 58, 61-64 (5th Cir. 1964); Yandell v.
United States, 315 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1963) (per curiam); Annabelle Candy Co. v.
Commissioner, 314 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1962); Fulton Container Co. v. United States,
INCONSISTENT TAX CLAIMS
competing,15 or that the covenant was inserted without negotiation l or
merely as a means of lessening a tax burden,17 the Tax Court will go
beyond the contract to the underlying economic nature of the transaction
and tax it accordingly.' 8
It is in the interest of both the Government and the public that taxes
be assessed fairly, for valid economic reasons, and against the proper
party. Determining the placement of the tax burden solely from contract
terms may lead to inequities for individual taxpayers, 19 and tends to
weaken public confidence in the tax system itself. Since our tax structure
is one of self assessment, the value of having revenue payments based on
economic reality 20 is apparent. On a more immediately practical level,
64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9635 (D. Cal. 1964); Van Kirk v. United States, 63-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 11 9277 (D. Ore. 1963) ; Betty W. Crissey, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 947 (1961).
The courts have articulated two reasons for relying on the treatment given the
covenant in the contract: "The tax avoidance desires of the buyer and seller in such
a situation are ordinarily antithetical, forcing them, in most cases, to agree upon a
treatment which reflects the parties' true intent with reference to the covenants, and
the true value of them in money." Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305, 308 (2d
Cir. 1959). Another court stated that: "Such a result gives certainty to the reason-
able expectations of the parties and relieves the Commissioner of the impossible task
of assigning fair values to good will and to covenants." Schulz v. Commissioner,
294 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir. 1961).
A taxpayer seeking tax treatment inconsistent with the contract must introduce
strong proof to overcome the declaration of the parties. Barran v. Commissioner,
supra at 63; UlIman v. Commissioner, supra at 308. The presumption that the con-
tract expresses the true intent of the parties has made specific allocation, or lack of it,
the dominant factor in determining the tax treatment of covenants. See Rogers v.
United States, 290 F2d 501 (9th Cir. 1961) (per curiam), upholding the trial court's
refusal to look beyond the contract terms, and Annabelle Candy Co. v. Commissioner,
supra at 4, in which the plaintiff unsuccessfully contended that if a covenant had
value, some allocation had to be made to it even if no allocation appeared in the con-
tract. But see notes 15-17 infra and accompanying text.
Despite some inequities for certain taxpayers this approach may be justified on
the grounds that the competing tax interests of the parties will produce a reasonable
tax treatment and that it is administratively impossible for the IRS to determine the
proper allocation in all cases. But cf. note 7 supra.
15 Max J. Epstein, 23 CCH Tax Ct Mem. 1167, 1168-69 (1964) (seller was
seventy-four years old, blind, and had a heart condition); Andrew A. Monaghan,
40 T.C. 680, 686 (1963) (seller did not intend to operate the same type of business
and was ill).
16john W. Shleppey, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 793, 796 (1963) (total sale price
set without reference to the covenant) ; Sidney Alper, 15 CCH Tax. Ct. em. 1415,
1417 (1956) (covenant was not negotiated as a separate item).
17 Fox & Hounds' Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Meem. 1216, 1226, 1228 (1962) (covenant
worthless and inserted solely for tax purposes) ; Harry Shwartz, 19 CCH Tax Ct
Mem. 1276, 1280-81 (1960) (covenant unilaterally inserted by buyer for tax purposes).
18 See also Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1940).
19 See cases cited notes 15-17 supra. The taxpayers in those cases would have
paid substantially different taxes if the contract rather than the economic reality of
the transaction, had been the determinative factor in the tax treatment of covenants
not to compete.
2 0 "Economic reality," as used in this context, must be defined as that assessment
of economic factors which the tax authorities and tribunals, had they all the facts
before them, would ultimately make. The crucial factor which makes covenants not
to compete economically relevant is the possibility of competition by the seller which
would impair the value of the purchase. Absent the possibility of competition the
covenant has no value, and hence no special tax treatment should be accorded it.
Defining economic reality in terms of the tax authorities' conclusions is necessary
because it is on them that the outcome of cases like Stern turns. To the extent that
such assessments are "incorrect" the remedy lies in direct appeal or statutory reform,
not in the contrary determination of a nontax court in a connected case.
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the Government has a valid interest in insisting that the tax treatment be
consistent with economic reality, for the tax revenue on a particular sale
varies depending upon whether a covenant is included in the sale. If a
covenant is not a part of the transaction, or if the Tax Court invalidates
it for some reason, the seller who has made a profit pays a capital gains
tax at the rate of twenty-five percent on the amount that would have been
allocated to it2-1 and the buyer is not allowed a deduction. If there is a
covenant, the amount that the seller received for it is taxed at the ordinary
income rate 2 2 rather than at the capital gain rate, and the buyer is allowed
to amortize the cost of the covenant over its useful life.2 Assuming that
the corporate taxpayers are in the same tax bracket, the additional revenue
received because the seller of a covenant pays an ordinary income rate
of forty-eight percent, rather than a twenty-five percent capital gains rate,
is less than the revenue loss which results from reducing the buyer's taxable
income by allowing him totally to amortize the cost of the covenant.
In a sense, the Government is a "silent party" to all business transac-
tions; the protection of its tax revenue is a valid reason for insisting that
a covenant not to compete serve a useful business function and is not in-
serted merely to lessen tax burdens. These considerations of tax policy
and of the economic nature of covenants not to compete are important
factors in determining whether there should be a right to recover damages
for breach of an agreement regarding the tax consequences of a transaction.
There are strong arguments in favor of enforcing the contractual
characterizations of such transactions.2 The parties have probably bar-
21 Since no money was paid for the covenant not to compete, the sale was only
one of capital assets which are taxed at the capital gains rate of 25%. See, e.g., Max
J. Epstein, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1167, 1169 (1964).
2 See notes 1, 13 supra.
23 See notes 2, 13 supra. The deduction is permitted because the covenant has
a definite life, so that its cost can be amortized over a set period. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.167(a)-3 (1956), as amended, T.D. 6452, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 127. If the deduction
was claimed for one year the buyer would not pay any tax on the cost of the covenant.
If it is amortized over several years, the deduction of part of the cost each year will
reduce the buyer's taxable income by that amount for that year. The total of these
yearly deductions will equal the cost of the covenant. In either situation, the total
tax revenue from that particular transaction is reduced if the buyer claims a deduction
for the covenant. See note 24 infra.
24 This is seen by postulating a situation in which $100,000 has been explicitly
allocated to the covenant in a sale between corporations. If this amount is not taxed
as a covenant not to compete the seller will pay a capital gains tax of $25,000. Since
the buyer is not allowed a deduction its taxable income will be undiminished, and it
will pay the ordinary corporate income tax rate of 48% on its earnings. This
$100,000 then will produce $25,000 of tax revenue. If it is treated as a covenant not
to compete the seller pays the ordinary corporate income rate, or $48,000, the buyer
is allowed to amortize $100,000, the cost of the covenant from its gross income. It
pays a tax $48,000 lower in the long run than it would have had the covenant not
been purchased. In this situation the higher tax paid by the seller is offset by the
deduction granted the buyer. Thus, the transaction which does not include the cove-
nant produces $25,000 more tax revenue than does the transaction which includes the
covenant.2 5 !These agreements may appear in all contracts in which there is a covenant
not to compete and either a reasonable or unreasonable allocation to the covenant.
The absence of any allocation in a contract in which a covenant is included may be
realistic or unrealistic depending upon the factual situation. Compare note 7 ,ipra.
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gained with the tax consequences in mind and have reached a result accept-
able to both sides. As indicated by the Stern case, a breach of this type
of agreement will often result in large expense to the other party; when one
party to a transaction claims tax treatment which is inconsistent with the
other party's claim, both are likely to be involved in litigation with the
IRS before the proper tax treatment of the transaction is finally deter-
mined.20 Even if the nonbreaching party is certain that it has properly
assessed its tax liability, the large amount at stake makes it mandatory that
experienced, and expensive,2 7 legal counsel be retained to prepare for
the litigation. Providing a right to recover these expenses would seem to
be a proper function of contract law so long as such recovery does not
frustrate the policies of the tax laws.
These arguments in favor of enforcing all agreements regarding the
tax consequences of such transactions proceed from the premise that the
parties have bargained at arm's length and have, in fact, reached a definite
agreement. Putting aside for the moment the question whether such tax
consequences should be a subject of bargaining, there remain many in-
stances in which a contract is ambiguous or silent on a particular point.
The parties may have neglected to discuss it or, having discussed it, been
unable to reach an agreement and purposely left the contract vague on that
point. In either case, both parties are likely to interpret the contract in
a light most favorable to themselves and thus claim inconsistent tax treat-
ment. If courts find breaches of agreements in situations where both
parties to the contract are able to support different conclusions on the tax
treatment to be given the transaction, the threat of contractual liability will
tend to deter parties to such ambiguous agreements from pressing arguable
claims to favorable tax treatment before the IRS. It is desirable that the
courts do not unnecessarily obstruct the attempt, consistent with the revenue
laws, of taxpayers to minimize their tax burdens. Moreover, the litigation
of competing claims may be the only way of determining the proper tax
treatment to be given the particular transaction.2 8  Therefore, courts should
28 There are some cases in which both parties' suits were consolidated in one
action: Howard Constr. Co., 43 T.C. 343 (1964); Max J. Epstein, 23 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1167 (1964); Bradley J. Broyles, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1148 (1962); Estate
of Leo Melnik, 21 CCH Tax Ct Mem. 671 (1962), aff'd sub owm. Karan v. Com-
missioner, 319 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1963); Betty W. Crissey, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mein.
947 (1961) ; Ray H. Schulz, 34 T.C. 235 (1960), aff'd, 294 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1961).
Cases in which there were separate suits: Gazette Tel. Co., 19 T.C. 692 (1953),
aff'd, 209 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 194); Clarence Clark Hamlin's Trust, 19 T.C. 718
(1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954); Toledo.Blade Co., 11 T.C. 1079 (1948),
aff'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. detied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950);
Toledo Newspaper Co., 2 T.C. 794 (1943).
27The Stern plaintiff was charged over $20,000 for legal services performed in
contesting the tax deficiencies before the IRS and the Tax Court. 238 F. Supp. at
909. The court held these fees reasonable, id. at 916, and it is valid to assume that
the defendant spent a comparable amount. The Sternp legal expenses do not include
the fees incurred in bringing the suit for breach of contract.
2 8 See, e.g., Max Levine, 21 CCH Tax Ct Mem. 363 (1962), aff'd, 324 F.2d 298
(3d Cir. 1963), in which the seller claimed that the excess of price over book value
766 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
not grant a recovery for a breach of an agreement regarding the tax con-
sequences of a transaction in a situation where a reasonable construction
of the contract produces tvo arguable but inconsistent methods of deter-
mining the parties' respective tax burdens. In this situation the right of
a taxpayer to contest his tax liability seems controlling.
In Stern the court's finding of an agreement on the tax consequences
was based upon the consistent reference to the contract price as the price
of the stock and the absence of an allocation of any part of the purchase
price to the covenant not to compete.29 Standing alone, it would not seem
that such evidence could support a specific indication of the parties' inten-
tion. Indeed, the lack of a specific allocation of money to the covenant may
more reasonably be supposed to have resulted from the failure of the parties
to reach agreement on a specific figure than from an agreement that nothing
was to be paid for the covenant. However, applying the parol evidence
rule, the court construed a precontract letter from buyer to seller as part
of the agreement 30 In this letter the buyer stated that Stern would
receive capital gains treatment on the purchase price.31 Although it could
be argued that this letter, written in the early stages of the negotiations, ) 2
should not suffice absent a specific disclaimer of an allocation in the final
document, the court's reading of the parties' intention was probably correct.
It seems clear that State Loan conveyed to Stern the impression that the
transfer would be wholly one of capital assets, and thus the court could
reasonably have found that the parties had agreed on the tax consequences
of the transaction.
There remains, however, the problem of the clear contractual charac-
terization which is contrary to the economic realities of the transaction.
An examination of the tax cases dealing with covenants not to compete
indicates that parties to the agreement are often unaware of the tax
ramifications of the use of a covenant not to compete.p Blanket enforce-
ment of such agreements would deprive parties of the tax treatment to
which they are economically entitled in those cases where the contract is
not consistent with business reality 4 A party, believing that he can reduce
his tax liability by claiming tax treatment inconsistent with the contract,
is faced with a difficult choice. If he reports his tax liability in a manner
of the tangible assets was paid for goodwill while the buyer claimed this amount was
paid for the covenant not to compete. The court recognized the value of each side's
claim and split the disputed sum, allocating one-half to goodwill, and one-half to the
covenant not to compete.
29 See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text
30 238 F. Supp. at 912.
3 1 Id. at 903-04.
32 The letter was sent one week after negotiations began in response to an inquiry
by Stern regarding the tax consequences of the transaction. Id. at 903. It seems
unrealistic that an agreement regarding an important part of the sale-a question
involving several hundred thousand dollars in tax liability, id. at 914 n.5-would be
made in this fashion, and that the letter would be the only memorial of that agreement.
3 3 E.g., Schulz v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir. 1961).
84 See cases cited notes 15-17 supra.
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consistent with the contract he avoids the possibility of a breach of contract
action, but in so doing he waives his claim to the favorable tax treatment
to which he is economically entitled. His alternative is to risk being sued
for breach of contract by claiming the tax treatment to which he is eco-
nomically entitled, but which is inconsistent with the contract. In such a
case, judging by the Stern analysis, liability would seem to be dependent
upon the court's interpretation of the contract terms, and not upon whether
the taxpayer was economically justified in claiming the favorable tax treat-
ment. Conceivably a party could prevail in the Tax Court by justifying
his claim to the tax treatment even though it was inconsistent with the
contract but, in a subsequent contract action, be held liable for the damages
that the other party incurred as a result of his action. Consistent with
Stern, these damages might include not only the other party's litigation
expenses,'m  but also the difference between the other party's tax burden
as determined by the contract and his tax liability as determined by the
Tax Court. 6 The threat of having to pay the extra taxes that were
validly assessed against the other party, along with the litigation expenses
of both parties in both actions, would effectively deter a party from claim-
ing tax treatment inconsistent with the contract even if he knew his
claim to be justified under the tax laws. A wholly contract oriented view
would thus deter the litigation of arguable claims. Inevitably, it would
allow some parties tax windfalls which are economically unwarranted,
deprive other parties of tax benefits permitted under the tax laws, and
adversely affect the tax revenue.3 7 Thus the courts should not enforce
agreements regarding the tax consequences of transactions when the tax
liabilities of the parties as reflected in the contract are inconsistent with
the economic reality of the situation.
A counterargument to this conclusion is that the parties have nego-
tiated for a specific result and that the tax benefit was knowingly waived
35 Where one party's action forces another person to protect or defend his inter-
ests in court against a third party's claim, the counsel fees incurred in that case are
recoverable from the third party.
Cases in which attorney's fees which were incurred in defending tort claims were
recoverable from the third party are: General Elec. Co. v. Mason & Dixon Lines,
Inc., 186 F. Supp. 761 (W.D. Va. 1960); Pure Oil Co. v. Geotechnical Corp., 129
F. Supp. 194 (E.D. La. 1955).
Cases in which attorney's fees incurred as a result of a breach of contract were
recoverable from the breaching party are: Reichard v. Ezl. Dunwoody Co., 45 F.
Supp. 153 (E.D. Pa. 1942); Hiss v. Friedberg, 201 Va. 572, 112 S.E.2d 871 (1960).
The law in this area is given detailed treatment in Annot., 4 A.L.R. 3d 270 (1965);
S CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1037 (1964); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTrs § 334 (1932).
36A recovery from an offending party who caused another to defend against the
claim of a third party is not limited to counsel fees, but also includes any judgment
that the third party recovered. See Reichard v. Ezl. Dunwoody Co., stpra note 35.
Thus the extra amount of taxes assessed as a result of the breach could be considered
a recoverable item of damages.
37 If a covenant is included in the sale, but the seller is incapable of competing,
the seller pays the ordinary income rate instead of the lower capital gains rate on
the amount allocated to the covenant, even though it is economically worthless. The
buyer gets the benefit of a deduction for the covenant, and the Government receives
less tax revenue than it would have had if the transaction had been taxed on the
basis of the economic reality of the situation. See note 24 supra.
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in return for other consideration: a buyer, though insisting on a covenant
not to compete, might agree not to claim a deduction for it if the seller
agrees to a lower sale price.38 If there is a breach of this agreement,
refusing to enforce it would frustrate the intent of the parties and seem to
infringe on the freedom of contract. Furthermore, such a refusal would
give the buyer a windfall-he would get both the deduction and the lower
sale price. However, such a contract is in effect an agreement by both
parties to suppress the real economic nature of the transaction and sub-
stitute for it the contract terms. Enforcement of such agreements would
constitute tacit judicial approval of the concealment of the true facts of the
situation. While allowing the parties to bargain for tax benefits may be
advantageous to them, it is clearly contrary to the policy of having taxes
assessed on the basis of economic reality. When parties bargain in such
a way, they do so with the government's, and hence the public's, money.
Further, the courts would have difficulty in distinguishing between those
cases in which the tax benefit is waived voluntarily and those in which it
is the result of deception or ignorance. Finally, a judicial declaration that
such contracts are unenforceable when contrary to economic reality would
have the salutory effect of discouraging improper allocations: the hypo-
thetical seller is unlikely to accept a lower price if he knows that his quid
pro quo-capital gains treatment-is not an enforceable part of the con-
tract. Thus it would appear that a party's knowing waiver of a tax benefit
for other consideration is not a sufficient reason for enforcing such an
agreement.
It is suggested that courts should not grant damages for a breach of an
agreement regarding the tax consequences of a transaction unless the
contract shows a clear, unambiguous statement of the agreement and its
contemplated consequences, and it is proven that the resulting tax liabilities
are consistent with the economic reality of the transaction.
Assuming the Stern parties' specific agreement, it is difficult to say
whether the tax consequences called for in the contract are consistent with
the tax laws and with economic reality. A clear disposition of the parties'
tax claims by the IRS would be determinative. In Stern, however, the
IRS proceedings are not conclusive on this issue because neither claim was
prosecuted to a final decision. The orders terminating the parties' respec-
tive proceedings with the IRS are ambiguous, for there is a possibility
that these orders gave inconsistent tax treatment to the same transaction.
They permitted Stern to retain capital gains treatment for all of its profits
and allowed State Loan to amortize one-fourth of the amount that it had
originally claimed as a deduction.3 9 State Loan had made two arguments
before the IRS to support its claim to the deduction.40 The major conten-
38 This arrangement would be advantageous to the buyer if it had a large loss
carryover and did not expect to have taxable income for the year of the sale. The
seller could report the sale of a capital asset and not have to pay the ordinary income
rate on the amount that he had received for the covenant, thus reducing his tax burden.
89 238 F. Supp. at 908.4 0 Ibid.
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tion was that the excess over the book value of the stock was paid for the
covenant not to compete. This theory was, of course, inconsistent with
Stern's claim that no money was paid for the covenant and is the basis
of the breach of contract. The alternative theory was that the loans re-
ceivable at the time of the purchase had a value in excess of their face
amount because experience showed that loans receivable have an average
life of twenty-eight months, and that loan customers renew or refinance
them an average of 2.6 times. Since they have a known life they should
be deductible.41 It is impossible to determine which of the two arguments
the IRS accepted. The sum that State Loan was allowed to amortize may
have been for intangibles with a known life. On the other hand, the
amount is approximately the sum that would be deductible in any one year
of the five year life of the covenant. If the deduction was granted on the
basis of intangibles with a known life, then the IRS did not permit incon-
sistent tax treatment of the transaction, for State Loan's deduction would
not be related to the covenant or to Stern's claim to capital gains treatment
for all of its profits.42 In that case the disposition of the competing claims
would indicate that the IRS had accepted Stern's claim that no money was
paid for the covenant, and that this was consistent with the tax laws and
economic reality. If so, then in light of the agreement of the parties
regarding the tax consequences of the transaction,43 Stern was rightly
decided, even applying the suggested standard for enforcing such contracts.
However, if State Loan was permitted to take the deduction because of
the covenant, then the disposition of the competing claims by the IRS was
inconsistent for if State Loan could deduct the cost of the covenant, then
Stern should have paid the ordinary income rate on part of the money it
received. In this situation, the IRS proceedings would not determine
which claim was more consistent with the tax laws and economic reality.
Looking then to the facts of the transaction there are strong economic
arguments in favor of State Loan's claim to the deduction. The lack of a
specific money allocation does not mean that a covenant was not bought
and sold. It absence may be explained by the parties' not being able to
agree on a specific figure and deciding to leave the contract vague on that
point. Furthermore, the covenant clearly had value, for the customers
of Stem's stores were clients of the loan companies; 4 5 without the cove-
nant Stem was in a position to destroy the value of the sale by reopening
its loan business. State Loan had insisted on the covenant from the begin-
41 This theory was discussed in North Am. Loan & Thrift Co. No. 2, 39 T.C.
321, 325 (1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1963); United Fin. & Thrift Corp.,
31 T.C. 278, 282 (1958), aff'd, 282 F.2d 919, 922 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 902 (1961). These cases involved two of defendant's subsidiaries.
42 238 F. Supp. at 915 n.8.
43 See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
44 See Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 355 (7th Cir.
1955) ; Simon Harris, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 174 (1961); Frances Silberman, 22
T.C. 1240 (1954) ; B. T. Babbitt, Inc., 32 B.T.A. 693 (1935); Christensen Mach. Co.,
18 B.T.A. 256 (1929); 8 STAN. L. Rzv. 485 (1956).
45 238 F. Supp. at 903.
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ning of the negotiations,46 and some of its terms were later modified. 47
The actual transaction involved the sale of four of Stern's loan companies
to four of State Loan's subsidiaries under similar contracts. Only two
of these contracts, however, contained covenants not to compete.48 The
prices paid for these two loan companies and their respective covenants not
to compete were substantially higher than the net worth of the corpora-
tions while the purchase price of the other two corporations was slightly
less than their net worth.49 In view of these facts it seems unrealistic to
maintain that no money was paid for the covenant.
If the IRS's disposition of the competing claims was inconsistent, then
in light of the facts surrounding the transaction, it would appear that the
economic realities would favor State Loan's claim to the deduction. Thus
even though the court could find an agreement to the contrary regarding
the tax consequences of the transaction, any contract suit for damages for
breach of that agreement should not be enforced because of the policy
against encouraging the bargaining for tax benefits.
This proposed solution places emphasis on the IRS's and the Tax
Court's disposition of the competing claims because those are bodies
charged solely with the enforcement and interpretation of the tax laws,
and they are more proficient in handling the complex matters and economic
issues in tax litigation. Furthermore, if the contract courts adopt the find-
ings of the IRS and the Tax Court and use the same criteria, the results
in contract cases will not be contrary to the tax policies.
The proper disposition of the Stern case under the proposed require-
ments for the enforceability of such agreements would depend upon whether
or not the IRS permitted inconsistent tax treatment of the transaction.
Unfortunately the Stern court did not examine this question.50 If courts
are faced with the same ambiguous situation in the future it is suggested
that the better decision would be to insist upon strong evidence that the
plaintiff's position is supported by the economic reality of the transaction
before granting a recovery.
46Ibid.
47 Compare id. at 904-05, suith id. at 906-07.
4 8 Id. at 906-07.
49 Defendant's Brief in Reply to Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Motion To
Dismiss Complaint, pp. 18-19.
50 This conclusion [that State Loan claimed tax treatment inconsistent with
Stern, and if it was permitted that it would result in the disallowance of
Stern's capital gains benefits] is not negatived by the fact that the asserted
tax deficiency against plaintiff was dismissed by stipulation, while at the
same time the Government, [sic] allowed defendant's subsidiaries to amortize
25% of the amount by which their payment to plaintiff exceeded the book
value of the assets of the loan companies. This latter action was the result
of a stipulated settlement, and may well have reflected the Government's
acceptance in whole or in part of an alternative argument that the defendant
urged which was supportable without reference to the covenant not to compete.
238 F. Supp. at 915.
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